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Following the contributions of Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985), the literature on
the economic assimilation of immigrants has focused predominantly on the analysis
of migrants’ individual labor market outcomes and its relation to the duration of
residence in the host country. Most of this research considered immigrant males
and females separately, neglecting that the labor market behavior and assimilation
pattern may be aﬀected by interacting responses within households.
Only a few studies analyzed the labor market performance of immigrants in a
family context (Long 1980; Duleep and Sanders 1993; Baker and Benjamin 1997;
Blau et al. 2003; Cobb-Clark and Crossley 2004), concentrating on the investigation
of the “family investment hypothesis”. This hypothesis is based on the assumption
that newly arrived immigrants need to invest in host country-speciﬁc human capital
as the skills they acquired in their countries of origin may not be entirely transfer-
able to the requirements of the receiving country, and that the family may further
be subject to credit constraints and hence may need to ﬁnance these investments
by themselves. This leads to the conjecture that family members specialize: one
spouse invests in human capital while the other works in dead-end jobs and forgoes
investment in his or her own human capital in order to ﬁnance the family’s current
consumption and support the spouse’s skills accumulation.
The evaluation of the family investment hypothesis is empirically demanding
for several reasons. First, due to data limitations, missing information about the
cohabitation status of immigrant couples at the time of arrival might have caused
biased estimates of the observed assimilation proﬁles in previous studies. This data
problem is particularly severe if a large fraction of the observed couples started co-
habiting after migration, which may particularly be the case for mixed couples and
couples who did not migrate at the same time. Secondly, the male partner is typi-
cally designated as the “primary worker” who invests in human capital upon arrival
in the host country, while the female partner is considered to be the “secondary
worker”, who undertakes activities that ﬁnance consumption and the human capital
accumulation of the primary worker (Cobb-Clark and Crossley 2004). Many of the
4previous studies assume that immigrant household members migrated all at once.
Often, however, migration starts as a singular process, in which one member moves
to a new country alone and the rest of the family may follow later. Credit con-
straints and investment decisions of an immigrant at several points over the course
of the migration process may vary depending on whether the person initially moved
with or without the family.
So far, the economic literature on the labor market activities of immigrant fam-
ilies has been mainly used data for traditional immigration countries, such as Aus-
tralia, Canada and the US. Empirical evidence for Germany, a major immigration
country in the European Union, does not exist. It appears reasonable, however, to
assume that the labor market behavior of immigrant families in Germany may diﬀer
substantially from those in the traditional immigrant-receiving economies, because –
among other reasons – of a diﬀerent migration history and immigration policy. Us-
ing data for Germany may add to our understanding of the importance of the family
investment hypothesis for the explanation of immigrants’ labor market behavior.
Moreover, Germany represents an excellent case study for the investigation of
the family investment hypothesis. In the 1960s and early 1970s, a large number of
so-called “guest-workers” – primarily male labor migrants from Southern Europe –
were encouraged to migrate to Germany (Schmidt and Zimmermann 1992; Bauer
et al. 2005) as a reaction to a perceived shortage of unskilled labor. Due to the
ﬁrst oil price crises and the beginning of a recession in Germany, the recruitment
of guest-workers was stopped in 1973. Family reuniﬁcation, humanitarian immigra-
tion in the form of asylum seekers and war refugees, and the immigration of ethnic
Germans from Eastern Europe became the major channels of legal immigration to
Germany thereafter (Fertig and Schmidt 2001; Bauer et al. 2005). These diﬀerent
immigration regimes generated diﬀerent types of migrants, with sequential immi-
gration of families being the predominant mode for guest-workers and their families,
and the simultaneous immigration of families for ethnic Germans and immigrant
families who entered Germany after the recruitment stop.
Departing from the empirical approach proposed by Baker and Benjamin (1997),
we test whether a specialization of household members that aﬀects the individual
5assimilation process exists. We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) that allow us to observe the marital status of immigrant couples at the
time of arrival. Further, we compare the behavior and adjustment of simultaneous
and sequential immigrant families.
In contrast to Baker and Benjamin (1997), we ﬁnd that the family investment
hypothesis is not supported for the German case. We rather conﬁrm the results of
Blau et al. (2003), who rejected the family investment hypothesis for the US. Immi-
grant husbands and immigrant wives both work less upon arrival than comparable
natives. We further ﬁnd assimilation in both, labor supply and wages. Our results
imply that immigrants tend to invest in their own human capital rather than to
specialize. In addition, our results suggest that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
the adjustment pattern between immigrant husbands who migrated with their wives
and those who arrived alone. We only observe assimilation of the labor supply of
immigrant husbands who migrated with their spouse. In contrast to men, the labor
supply of wives assimilates to that of comparable natives, irrespective of whether
they arrive together with their husbands or whether they join him later.
2 The Family Investment Hypothesis
The existing literature on the family investment hypothesis has produced rather
mixed results by either comparing labor market outcomes of native and immigrant
couples (Long 1980; Beach and Worswick 1993; Worswick 1996, 1999) or immigrant
couples that were considered to be more or less likely to invest in human capital
(Duleep and Sanders 1993; MacPherson and Stewart 1989). Long (1980) demon-
strates that although immigrant women have higher earnings upon their arrival to
the US than comparable native women, the earnings gap between immigrant and
native women declines with the duration of residence in the US. Since these pat-
terns are directly opposed to those of immigrant men, Long (1980) concludes that
the observed proﬁles might indicate that immigrant wives are working to ﬁnance US-
speciﬁc human capital investments of their husbands. Duleep and Sanders (1993)
and Worswick (1999) provide further evidence in support of the family investment
6hypothesis. By comparing the labor market outcomes of immigrant couples from
diﬀerent countries of origin, Duleep and Sanders (1993) demonstrate that the labor
force participation of married immigrant women depends on the husbands’ invest-
ment in skills relevant to the US labor market. Worswick (1999) ﬁnds that credit
constraints signiﬁcantly aﬀect the labor supply decisions of recently arrived immi-
grant families. In contrast to these studies, MacPherson and Stewart (1989) and
Beach and Worswick (1993) could not conﬁrm the family investment hypothesis.
A major shortcoming of these studies has been the adoption of empirical ap-
proaches that do not allow to isolate the eﬀects of credit constraints from other
confounding factors such as the lack of skill transferability or the variation in prefer-
ences for work (Cobb-Clark and Crossley 2004). In addition to native and immigrant
couples, Baker and Benjamin (1997) consider mixed couples (in which one spouse is
native-born and one spouse is foreign-born) that are assumed to be less credit con-
straint than immigrant couples, to account for both human capital investments and
credit constraints. Using data from the Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances,
they ﬁnd that immigrant women married to immigrant men work more immediately
after migration, have ﬂatter wage proﬁles and a lower propensity to undertake hu-
man capital investments than immigrant women married to native-born men. Baker
and Benjamin (1997) consider these patterns to be consistent with the predictions
of the family investment hypothesis and rule out alternative explanations for the
observed labor market outcomes of immigrants to Canada.
Blau et al. (2003) implement the speciﬁcations of Baker and Benjamin (1997)
to examine the family investment hypothesis using data from the US Census of
Population for 1980 and 1990. They ﬁnd that both immigrant husbands and wives
work and earn less than comparable natives upon arrival in the US. However, both
spouses exhibit positive assimilation proﬁles of similar magnitude in labor supply
and wages. The authors conclude that both husbands and wives seem to invest
equally in their own human capital and reject the family investment hypothesis for
the US.
Both Baker and Benjamin (1997) and Blau et al. (2003) could not observe the
year of marriage of immigrant couples in their data, raising the possibility that the
7observed proﬁles are the result of selectivity into marriage rather than the duration
of migrants’ residence in the host country. This limitation is severe if a large fraction
of the observed couples got married after migration, which is likely to be the case for
mixed couples and couples who did not migrate at the same time. Cobb-Clark and
Crossley (2004) use data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia
(LSIA) that permit an identiﬁcation of couples which were married when arriving in
Australia. They extend the previous literature by using detailed information about
visa categories to identify the primary and secondary worker in an immigrant couple,
ﬁnding support for the family investment hypothesis only among families in which
the primary worker is male.
Departing from the study of Baker and Benjamin (1997), we evaluate the family
investment hypothesis for immigrants in Germany to test whether there exists some
form of role specialization within the household that inﬂuences individual labor
market assimilation. Since the marital status upon arrival is known in our data, we
are able to concentrate our analysis on immigrants who were married at the time
of migration, allowing us to disentangle the observed assimilation proﬁles from the
eﬀects of assortative mating.
Most importantly, however, we address inconsistencies in the empirical speciﬁca-
tion of existing empirical studies that aim to test the family investment hypothesis.
The family investment model rests on the assumption that families migrate together,
because credit constraints and investment decisions of an immigrant at several points
over the course of migration may vary depending on whether the person moved with
or is joined later by the family. Therefore, previous studies typically assumed that
immigrant household members migrated all at once. Departing from this assump-
tion, however, the typical empirical model used in the existing literature identiﬁes
the major parameters to test the family investment hypotheses using only house-
holds whose members migrated in succession. Only Cobb-Clark and Crossley (2004)
restrict their analysis to the sample of immigrant couples who migrated together.
However, they do not analyze immigrant couples who arrived successively. We ad-
dress these inconsistencies and extend our analysis by comparing the behavior and
adjustment of couples arriving together and couples arriving sequentially.
83 Data and Empirical Strategy
In examining the labor market assimilation of immigrants in Germany, we rely on
a pooled sample drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the
years 1984 to 2005.1 By using several cross-sections of nationally representative
data, bias in the assimilation eﬀects due to changing heterogeneity of cohorts can
be reduced (Blau et al. 2003). Immigrants living in East Germany comprise less
than two percent of the immigrant population. Thus, we restrict our analysis to
West Germany. The initial sample is further restricted to married couples, natives
and immigrants alike, aged 16 to 64 years. The GSOEP provides information on
immigrants who immigrated to Germany after 1949. Self-employed as well as indi-
viduals who are in the military or civil services are dropped from the sample. This
set of sample speciﬁcations are analogous to those of Baker and Benjamin (1997)
and Blau et al. (2003), thus making our results comparable to the existing evidence
for Canada and the US.
After excluding observations with missing values for relevant variables, the work-
ing sample for our empirical analysis comprises 60,844 couples, of which 69 percent
are native families (husband and wife are native born), 24 percent are immigrant
families (husband and wife are both immigrants), and seven percent are mixed fam-
ilies (couples comprising one immigrant and one native). Since we aim to examine
the adjustment of immigrants as family units, we concentrate our succeeding analy-
ses on couples where both the husband and the wife are immigrants vis-` a-vis native
households.
Unlike most other studies that investigate the family investment hypothesis, we
are able to identify whether an immigrant is married at the time of migration.
This allows us to avoid a potential bias in our estimation results due to assortative
mating after immigration (Cobb-Clark and Crossley 2004). Restricting our sample
1The data used in this paper was extracted from the GSOEP Database provided
by the DIW Berlin (http://www.diw.de/GSOEP) using the Add-On package Pan-
elWhiz v1.0 (October 2006) for Stata R . PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P.
Haisken-DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). The PanelWhiz-generated DO ﬁle used to
retrieve the GSOEP data and any Panelwhiz Plugins are available upon request.
Any data or computational errors in this paper are our own. Haisken-DeNew and
Hahn (2006) describe PanelWhiz in detail.
9to immigrants that have been married at the time of immigration, we are left with
7,550 immigrant families, which constitutes about 15 percent of our total sample.
These observations are weighted to represent the German population.
Immigrant families do not have to immigrate at the same time. In some cases, mi-
gration has been a chain process whereby a single member of the household migrates
alone and is possibly joined by the family later on. This is common where explicit
legal restrictions limit the entry of the family along with the principal immigrant
(Kuhn 2005). Additionally, it could result from a household’s collective response
to costs and opportunities to secondary migrants in the receiving country (Mincer
1978). The immigration process in Germany, as in most European countries, has
historically favored independent migration to prioritize meeting labor market needs
(Sriskandarajah 2005). In our sample, almost 37 percent of immigrant males ar-
rived ahead of their wives. For our purpose, it is interesting to examine whether
the labor market behavior and assimilation of an immigrant who arrived with the
spouse is diﬀerent when compared to a married immigrant who arrived alone, or
whether the spouse who arrived later is better able to adapt given the investments
into the speciﬁc human capital of the receiving country already undertaken by the
primary immigrant. In our empirical analysis, we categorize immigrant couples into
simultaneous and sequential migrant couples, where we deﬁne the former as couples
arriving in Germany in the same year and the latter as couples in which the husband
migrates ﬁrst and the wife arrives subsequently after a year or more.
To analyze immigrants’ labor supply behavior, we specify a model that simultane-
ously identiﬁes the eﬀect of length of residence, cohort-speciﬁc eﬀects and common
period eﬀects on hours of work, after controlling for demographic characteristics.
The following hours equation is estimated on the pooled sample of married couples,
separately for wives W and husbands H:
h
g























ik + κt + uit (1)
10for i = 1,...,N, t = 1,..., T, and g = W,H, where hit represents the annual hours
worked in the previous year for an individual i in year t.2 For both, males and
females, natives are used as reference groups.
This speciﬁcation allows the assimilation proﬁles of an immigrant in annual hours
worked to be aﬀected not only by the individual’s own length of residence in Ger-
many, but also by his or her spouse’s number of years since migration (YSMW and
YSMH), respectively. The intercept is also allowed to vary according to own and
spousal’s cohort of arrival eﬀects. The variables CW and CH are dummy variables
for the period of arrival of immigrant wives and immigrant husbands, respectively.
For instance, in the hours equation for husbands, γ2,k gives the cohort eﬀects for
men who immigrated in the kth period, while γ1,k is the cohort eﬀects for having
wives who arrived in period k. These cohort eﬀects are usually interpreted as net
“arrival eﬀect”.
One important drawback is adherent with this speciﬁcation, that is, the coeﬃ-
cients of interest for the test of the family investment hypothesis (the parameters
of the cross-eﬀects of YSM, δ1 and δ2, and the parameters on the cross-cohort ef-
fects, γ1k and γ2k, respectively) can only be identiﬁed for couples that immigrated
at diﬀerent points in time. Otherwise the variables YSMW and YSMH as well as
CW and CH are perfectly correlated with each other. Hence, a negative eﬀect of the
husbands’ duration of stay on wives’ labor supply, for example, does only support
the family investment hypothesis if this hypothesis holds independent of whether
the couple immigrated at the same time or at diﬀerent points of time. As outlined
above, however, this is not necessarily the case. We therefore estimate equation
(1) separately for couples who immigrated together and couples who immigrated at
diﬀerent points of time without the respective cross-eﬀect of YSMand cross-cohort
eﬀects.
We assign arrival cohorts according to the phases of immigration in Germany
2The GSOEP does not directly report data on annual hours of work. Instead,
the variable was constructed for the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) using
information on employment status in the survey year, average number of hours
worked per week, and the number of months worked in the previous year. The
hours variable is generated by summing up estimated annual hours of full-time,
part-time and short-time work (Lillard 2006).
11as proposed by Schmidt and Zimmermann (1992). They categorized immigration
stages as follows: war adjustment (1945-1954), manpower recruitment (1955-1973),
consolidation or restrained migration (1974-1988), and the dissolution of socialism
and its aftermath (from 1989 to the present)3. Due to the paucity of observations
for those who immigrated before 1954, the ﬁrst and second phases are merged.
Therefore we identify three immigration cohorts, namely for the periods from 1949
to 1973, 1974 to 1988, and 1989 onwards. κt is a year-speciﬁc eﬀect which is assumed
to be the same for both natives and immigrants.
Xit is a vector of explanatory variables used to control for other determinants
of labor supply. The variables included in this vector are deﬁned in more detail
towards the end of the section and summarized in the appendix together with some
descriptive statistics. It includes own and spousal demographic variables including
age, years of education, and a dummy variable for German language proﬁciency.
The age of both the individual and the spouse enter the regressions as quadratic
functions. The vector Xit further incorporates dummy variables for the individual’s
state of residence in Germany and the immigrant’s region of birth. We classify
countries of birth into regions that account for the most important regions of origin
of Germany’s migrant population, in particular Turkey, Central and Eastern Europe,
ex-Yugoslavia, OECD and combined the rest into a heterogeneous composite group.
Finally, Xit includes the number of children living in the household, and a dummy
variable for the presence of children under seven years old.
The log wage equation takes a similar form except that spousal YSMand cohort
eﬀects are omitted. Wages are deﬁned as the annual labor earnings of the individual
in the previous year divided by annual hours worked.
4 Estimation Results
Following Baker and Benjamin (1997) and Blau et al. (2003), we test the family
investment hypothesis by comparing immigrant husbands with native husbands,
and immigrant wives with native wives. The results of the estimating equations for
3See Bauer et al. (2005) for details on phases of immigration in Germany.
12hours of work and wages are presented in Table 1.4 We begin by estimating our
models for all couples including mixed families to render comparability with other
studies. In a second step, we modify our sample to account for the issues discussed
in the previous section, that is, to compare couples who immigrated together with
couples who immigrated sequentially.
The estimation results suggest that an immigrant wife supplies more hours of
work as her length of residence to Germany increases, while she tends to work less
the longer the husband has remained in Germany. This assimilation pattern in labor
supply is similar to the results of Baker and Benjamin (1997) for Canada. However,
the wife’s own assimilation eﬀect dominates the cross eﬀect of the husband’s duration
of residence, where the latter is statistically insigniﬁcant. Own cohort eﬀects are all
negative, implying that immigrant wives have lower level of hours worked relative
to comparable native wives regardless of the period of arrival. Husband’s cohort
eﬀects on wife’s labor supply are signiﬁcantly positive indicating a relatively higher
supply of labor for female immigrants having immigrant husbands.
The own- and cross-eﬀects of years since migration on the labor supply of immi-
grant husbands have symmetric signs as those for immigrant wives, that is, positive
for own length of residence and negative with respect to the wife’s. Again, the inﬂu-
ence of the spouse’s duration of residence is insigniﬁcant. This symmetry extends to
the cohort eﬀects. The own cohort eﬀects are statistically negative, indicating that
immigrant men supply less hours of labor than comparable natives. Diﬀerent to the
females, however, the cross-cohort eﬀects are statistically insigniﬁcant, indicating
that the labor supply of immigrant men is not aﬀected by the immigration status
of their wife.
It is more insightful to consider the net assimilation proﬁle of labor supply of
married immigrants by summing up the own and the spousal eﬀect of duration of
residence (YSM) and the respective cohort eﬀects. The combined eﬀects of duration
4The equations are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to foster com-
parability with previous studies. Recognizing that the hours variable is censored at
zero, we also estimated the labor supply equations using a Tobit model. The results
from this model do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those obtained by using OLS. Sim-
ilar to Baker and Benjamin (1997) and Blau et al. (2003), the wage equations are
estimated excluding non-participants. Using a Tobit model instead of simple OLS
to estimate the wage estimation does not alter the qualitative results either.
13of residence and immigration cohort are summarized in Figure 1 for immigrant
wives and Figure 2 for immigrant husbands. For illustration, we take an immigrant
couple who hypothetically arrived anytime within the period 1974 to 1988, although
results are qualitatively analogous for those belonging to other cohorts. Upon arrival,
immigrant wives work about 230 hours less than comparable native wives, while
immigrant husbands supply about 430 hours less than native husbands. Our results
suggest that the number of hours worked by immigrant wives overtake those of
comparable natives after about 10 years of residence. The labor supply of immigrant
husbands, however, does not catch up to that of their native counterparts.
Overall, the patterns of labor supply of immigrant spouses in Germany suggest
that upon arrival, they work less than natives with similar characteristics, and then
gradually increase their labor supply as the duration of residence increases. Thus,
the results do not support the family investment hypothesis, because we do not ﬁnd
any convex assimilation proﬁle similar to those found by Baker and Benjamin (1997)
using Canadian data. Our results are rather comparable to those found by Blau et
al. (2003) for the US (see Figures 1 and 2).5
The estimation results for the wage equations are shown in the last two columns
of Table 1, while Figures 3 and 4 display the immigrant-native gap in log wages
for immigrant wives and husbands, respectively, together with the respective results
obtained by Baker and Benjamin (1997) for Canada and Blau et al. (2003) for
the US. The initial wage disadvantage upon arrival is much larger for immigrant
husbands in Germany if compared to both, the US and Canada, while immigrant
wives in Germany show an initial wage disadvantage that is considerably higher
than the comparable wage disadvantage in the US, but similar to that in Canada.
Looking at Figures 3 and 4, immigrant wives and immigrant husbands from cohort
1974-88 are observed to lag behind their native counterparts upon arrival by about
33 percent and 40 percent, respectively. Even though we observe an assimilation of
the wages of immigrants to comparable German natives, they do not overtake nor
catch up to those of the natives such as in Canada and the US.
5Estimation results in Baker and Benjamin (1997) are evaluated for immigrants
who arrived in Canada in the period 1976-1980, while Blau et al. (2003) considered
US immigrants who arrived in the period 1975-1979.
14Table 2 shows the estimation results when augmenting the basic speciﬁcation
in order to account for the eﬀects of wage earnings and non-labor income on labor
supply. Wages for those who are unemployed are imputed by predicting log wages
from a regression on a sample of individuals who worked less than 700 hours in
the previous year separately for husbands and wives. Following earlier studies, we
further estimated this model by two-stage least squares (2SLS) using the individuals’
wage deciles as an instrument for their wages, to adjust for potential measurement
error in the wage variable, assuming that the measurement error is likely to be
smaller in measuring deciles than actual or predicted wages (Blau et al. 2003).
The estimation results indicate that while the wage and asset income eﬀects are
in general signiﬁcant, assimilation eﬀects previously observed are still signiﬁcant in
explaining the observed variation in hours worked. In fact, the assimilation patterns
in labor supply remain unchanged even after controlling for earnings variables: hours
worked increase with own years since migration while spousal duration of residence
has insigniﬁcant eﬀect; own cohort eﬀects remain positive and spousal cohort eﬀects
are negative as before. Referring to the OLS-results, the magnitudes of eﬀects
are similar to those reported in Table 1. The OLS results from the augmented
equations show that labor supply are decreasing in own and spousal wages, but
are a lot more responsive to own earnings eﬀect. Using either OLS or two-stage
regression, husbands’ employment level is shown to be hardly aﬀected by a change
in wives’ labor earnings. Labor supply of both husbands and wives are increasing
in household income from asset ﬂows.
Overall, the assimilation proﬁles for immigrant husbands and wives do not pro-
vide evidence for the family investment hypothesis. The symmetric patterns of hours
of work for immigrant husbands and wives in Germany do not imply that there is a
specialization into “investing” and “supporting” activities as suggested by the ﬁnd-
ings of Baker and Benjamin (1997). Similar to the ﬁndings of Blau et al. (2003) for
the US, both labor supply and wages of immigrant husbands and wives increase with
the number of years since migration. The results suggest that their patterns follow
a simple process of human capital accumulation, that is, both immigrant husbands
and immigrant wives start out with lower wages and lower levels of labor supply
15than comparable natives, but after some form of investment in host country-speciﬁc
human capital, their labor market outcomes improve with years of residence.
4.1 Investment Activities of Immigrants
Since we do not ﬁnd any support for the family investment hypothesis by looking at
assimilation patterns of labor supply and wages, we investigate whether immigrants
provide support for their spouses by delaying investment in own skills. If the family
investment hypothesis holds, we might expect that immigrant spouses who were
“chosen” to support the family in the early years of migration would postpone in-
vestments in their own skills. On the other hand, the spouses who were “designated”
to initially invest in post-migration skills would reduce or withdraw from training in
the latter course of migration in the new country. To test this hypotheses, we run a
probit model to explain whether an individual undergoes training, where training
is deﬁned as a dummy variable equal to one if the individual is receiving education
or undergoing other forms of training. We relate training to the usual demographic
and assimilation variables of the individual and the spouse. The estimation results,
which are reported in Table 3, show that the number of years since migration do
not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the decision to take up formal training.
Another implication of the family investment hypothesis is that the spouse who
undertakes the “supporting” role would choose to limit job mobility in the years
shortly after arrival in order to not disrupt income ﬂows for the household. This
is done even if the individual’s career opportunities and wage improvement on the
aforesaid job are limited. In this sense, the family investment hypothesis predicts
that the wage proﬁle of the supporting spouse is ﬂatter. In contrast, the spouse
who is “investing” is allowed to explore the job market as the individual tries to
ﬁnd better career opportunities. The last two columns of Table 3 show that the
job tenure of immigrant wives and immigrant husbands in Germany both increase
as their duration of stay increases. This eﬀect is accounted for by own assimilation
for immigrant husbands, while the duration of stay of the wives does not have an
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the job tenure of husbands. For immigrant wives, the assim-
ilation eﬀect is predominantly due to the cross-assimilation eﬀect, while the own
16assimilation eﬀect is insigniﬁcant. Again, these results do not support the family
investment hypothesis as an explanation for immigrant labor market behavior in
Germany.
4.2 Assimilation of Immigrant Families
In the next step, we exclude immigrants who are married to natives from our analy-
sis. We do not expect substantial deviations from the patterns initially found arising
merely from this sample restriction, because mixed families comprise only seven per-
cent of all couples. Nevertheless, this sample restrictions allows us to concentrate
on the examination of the behavior of immigrants in the context of family migra-
tion, which is the underlying premise of the family investment model. Furthermore,
since we have information on year of marriage and year of immigration, we are able
to restrict the following analysis on immigrants who were already married to each
other before immigrating to Germany. This restriction ensures that the assimila-
tion eﬀects that we capture are not aﬀected by selectivity into marriage in the new
country.
Results for the modiﬁed sample and the basic speciﬁcation are presented in Ta-
ble 4. The estimation results show that the overall assimilation patterns for labor
supply and wages are very similar to those reported in Table 1 and Figures 1 to 4.
Compared to the overall sample, the hours and wage assimilation for immigrants,
after excluding those who are married to natives, are somewhat faster.6 If credit
constraints are stricter for pure immigrant families, as asserted by Baker and Ben-
jamin (1997), which should result in higher incentives to specialize, we would have
found one spouse working more so that the supported partner assimilates faster
in wages. However, since the assimilation proﬁles are again symmetric, we cannot
attribute the faster assimilation of one spouse to the support of the other. This
permits the conclusion that immigrants with immigrant spouses adjust their labor
supply faster, possibly because they are more pressed to contribute to household
6We also estimated the models for immigrants who migrated at age 25 or above
and looked separately at Turkish couples who comprise about 37 percent of im-
migrant couples. We ﬁnd the same concavity proﬁle in labor supply and no wage
assimilation for Turkish immigrants.
17earnings and invest in own skills rather than necessarily back up the investment of
the partner.
4.3 Simultaneous vs. Sequential Migration
Household members do not necessarily have to migrate all at the same time. In
many cases, migration proceeds as a sequential process whereby one member moves
to the new country and is eventually joined by the rest of the household. The case
of Germany’s guest worker program is an excellent example of this phenomenon.
From the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, Germany recruited guest-workers to meet a
shortage of unskilled labor (Bauer et al. 2005). While the program was oriented such
that foreigners would leave the country after terminal employment, some migrants
routinely renewed their contracts and stayed longer than aimed by the recruitment
policy. Those who stayed beyond 1973, when the recruitment of guest-workers has
been stopped by the German government, subsequently earned the right to bring
their families to Germany (Martin 2002). Based on this right, family reuniﬁcation
became the most important source of immigration from the 1973 until the late 1980s.
In our sample, about 37 percent of married immigrant males moved to Germany
alone, leaving behind their spouses in the country of origin and bringing them to
Germany later on.
We categorize immigrant families according to how family migration took course,
namely simultaneously or sequentially, where the latter refers to the situation of the
husband migrating ahead of the wife.7 We make this distinction for two reasons.
First, we aim to clarify the coherence of the thesis of the family investment model
and the speciﬁcation used by Baker and Benjamin (1997). Second, we expect that
upon arrival, immigrant partners migrating together may face a set of constraints
and incentives diﬀerent from those faced by households who migrated in succession.
Spouses who migrated together are expected to require more capital in settling in
the new country. In addition, these couples may have stronger incentives to stay
permanently in Germany and thus a relatively higher motivation to invest in own
7Husbands who migrated ahead of their wives comprise more than 70 percent
of all couples migrating in succession. Therefore, we concentrate our analysis of
sequential migration to this group
18or in spouse’s skills suited to the German labor market. Hence we test whether
the stricter constraints and stronger incentives to stay leads the family investment
hypothesis to hold particularly for these couples. On the other hand, husbands who
immigrated alone may not have initially planned to stay in Germany permanently.
Therefore they do have relatively weaker incentives to invest in country-speciﬁc
human capital (Dustmann 1993).
Reviewing the thesis of Baker and Benjamin (1997), they posit that immigrant
couples face credit constraints shortly after arrival. This implicitly assumes that
couples migrated at the same time. However, as already noted above, in the econo-
metric speciﬁcation employed by Baker and Benjamin (1997) the eﬀect of own and
spousal years since migration and own and spousal cohort eﬀects can be identiﬁed
only for couples who migrated sequentially, because these variables will be perfectly
collinear for couples migrating simultaneously. We therefore implement the model
proposed by Baker and Benjamin (1997) only for the sub-sample of sequential mi-
grant couples. The results of this model are presented in Table 5. While the signs
for the assimilation eﬀects are the same as before and the respective own eﬀects
still dominate those of spouses’, we only observe signiﬁcant assimilation in hours
and wages for the wives. For the husbands who migrated alone, labor supply and
wages are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the duration of residence. Hence, we cannot
ﬁnd evidence in favor of the family investment hypothesis for couples that migrated
sequentially.
To facilitate comparison between the two groups of immigrant families, we con-
sider in a second step their assimilation proﬁles including only the individuals’ own
years since migration and cohort eﬀects, while still taking into account other spousal
and household characteristics. The results are presented in Tables 6a and 6b and
summarized in Figures 5 and 6. Under the simultaneous mode of migration, both
the wife and the husband experience signiﬁcant assimilation in hours. When the
wife arrives after the husband, only the wife’s labor supply shows some signiﬁcant
assimilation. The husband who arrives alone does not experience signiﬁcant assimi-
lation in both, hours and wages, indicating that the assimilation patterns captured
in the previous estimations have been mainly driven by immigrant men who arrived
19together with their wives. This conclusion is veriﬁed by our results for sequential
migrants shown in Table 5, where we ﬁnd that indeed husbands under this mode
of migration do not experience assimilation. Testing whether the labor supply pro-
ﬁles under the two modes of migration are diﬀerent, we ﬁnd that while wives who
arrived later than their husbands tend to assimilate faster than immigrant women
who migrated with their husbands, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between their
proﬁles. However, we reject equality of the assimilation proﬁles for husbands in
diﬀerent migration groups.
Tables 4 and 6b indicate that only wives who arrive after their husband expe-
rience wage assimilation. This result suggests that the information and resources
accumulated by the husband over the years while he was staying in Germany alone
may help his wife’s adjustment to the German labor market. Husbands may move
ahead of the wife and ﬁnd a stable job or establish networks that could assist the
settlement of the rest of the family. Borjas and Bronars (1991) also claim that in
the “chain of migration”, the later links or those who migrated after a spouse could
be more successful partly due to the transmission of information about labor market
opportunities across family members.
We ﬁnally examined for couples who migrated sequentially whether or not the
husband changes his labor supply when the wife arrives in Germany to see whether
there exists an added worker eﬀect. We therefore augment the speciﬁcation of
the regression model by including a dummy variable indicating whether the wife is
staying or even working in Germany as well as the duration of stay of the husband
while the wife is staying or working in Germany, respectively. Our results, which are
reported in Tables 7 and 8, show that there is no signiﬁcant modiﬁcation in labor
supply nor the assimilation pattern of the husband when his wife arrives, regardless
of whether the wife is working or not.
5 Conclusions
This paper examines whether immigrant families in Germany adopt a family invest-
ment strategy in deciding on the level of the labor market activity of their household
20members. The family investment hypothesis posits that upon arrival, an immigrant
spouse invests in host-country speciﬁc skills while the other partner works to ﬁnance
the family’s consumption and the human capital investments of the spouse. When
the partner accumulates enough human capital which could potentially improve his
or her earnings capacity, the spouse who was initially supporting the family reduces
his or her labor supply with increasing duration of residence.
Using panel data from the GSOEP, we do not ﬁnd evidence for the family invest-
ment hypothesis. Immigrant husbands and immigrant wives both work less upon
arrival than natives with similar characteristics. Thus the evidence do not suggest
spousal specialization into “investing” and “supporting” roles in the families’ early
years of migration. Both immigrant husbands and wives increase their labor supply
as their numbers of years since migration increase, suggesting a standard process of
human capital accumulation of individuals. Overall, we observe positive but weak
assimilation of the wages of immigrants. Their wages further do not catch up to
those of comparable natives in spite of their length of residence in Germany.
The paper also analyzes the labor market behavior of immigrant couples who
migrated together and those who migrated sequentially, recognizing the fact that
circumstances, incentives and constraints may vary under diﬀerent modes of mi-
gration. Husbands and wives who migrated simultaneously experience assimilation
in labor supply but not in wages. On the other hand, for couples who migrated
sequentially, we observe that wives who migrated after their husbands assimilate
both in labor supply and wages. This ﬁnding could entail that the the resources and
information about the local labor market that husbands have accumulated over the
years of unaccompanied migration could have helped the labor market adjustment
of their wives.
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Annual Hours Number of hours worked in the previous year
Sum of estimated hours of full-time, part-time
and short-time work
Log (husband wage) Hourly labor earnings of the male spouse
(in log), includes wages and salary from all
employment
Log (wife wage) Hourly labor earnings of the female spouse
(in log), includes wages and salary from all
employment
HH Asset Income (per 100 euros) Household’s annual income from interest, dividend
and rent
YSM, husband Number of years since migration if respondent
immigrated and is a male spouse; 0 otherwise
YSM, wife Number of years since migration if respondent
immigrated and is a female spouse; 0 otherwise
IM89up, wife 1 if respondent is a female spouse and immigrated
within the period 1989 to 2005; 0 otherwise
IM7488, wife 1 if respondent is a female spouse and immigrated
within the period 1974 to 1988; 0 otherwise
IM4973, wife 1 if respondent is a female spouse and immigrated
within the period 1949 to 1973; 0 otherwise
IM89up, husband 1 if respondent is a male spouse and immigrated
within the period of 1989 to 2005; 0 otherwise
IM7488, husband 1 if respondent is a male spouse and immigrated
within the period of 1974 to 1988; 0 otherwise
IM4973, husband 1 if respondent is a male spouse and immigrated
within the period of 1949 to 1973; 0 otherwise
Training 1 if respondent is receiving education or training
in survey year; 0 otherwise





Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Husbands:
Annual Hours 2035.900 873.743 1627.657 946.867
Log Wages 2.760 0.519 2.486 0.427
Age 45.220 10.593 48.112 9.543
Years of Education 12.142 2.663 10.124 2.337
Job Tenure 12.443 11.130 7.833 8.087
Training 0.005 0.067 0.003 0.050









Central & Eastern Europe 0.154 0.361
Ex-Yugoslavia 0.125 0.331
Other regions 0.198 0.398
Wives:
Annual Hours 871.535 891.851 844.588 919.233
Log Wages 2.305 0.674 2.177 0.525
Age 42.582 10.542 45.417 9.591
Years of Education 11.462 2.284 9.411 2.420
Job Tenure 5.508 8.129 3.977 6.408
Training 0.006 0.077 0.005 0.067
Years since Migration 17.453 8.235
Year of Migration: 1989-2005 0.256 0.436
1974-1988 0.292 0.454
1949-1973 0.453 0.498




Central & Eastern Europe 0.155 0.362
Ex-Yugoslavia 0.120 0.325
Other regions 0.209 0.407
Note.– Unweighted sample. Sample excludes mixed families.
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Table 1
Labor Supply and Wage Assimilation of Immigrants (Including Mixed
Families, 1984-2005)
Annual Hours Log Wages
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
YSM, wife 43.178** -18.175 0.020*
(10.892) (11.995) (0.009)
YSM2, wife -0.669** 0.233 -0.000*
(0.230) (0.265) (0.000)
YSM, husband -13.041 37.197* 0.013+
(12.129) (15.145) (0.007)
YSM2, husband 0.046 -0.536+ -0.000
(0.237) (0.291) (0.000)
IM89up, wife -567.033** 89.893 -0.470**
(88.317) (97.647) (0.075)
IM7488, wife -651.693** 268.392+ -0.305**
(133.502) (138.171) (0.110)
IM4973, wife -490.625** 285.326 -0.232+
(171.620) (174.974) (0.119)
IM89up, husband 300.011** -635.516** -0.475**
(95.919) (130.935) (0.057)
IM7488, husband 420.605** -698.988** -0.417**
(133.903) (196.366) (0.086)
IM4973, husband 478.876** -859.007** -0.401**
(177.114) (232.752) (0.090)
Constant 555.750** -1790.595** 0.421* 0.618**
(194.109) (187.674) (0.164) (0.119)
R-squared 0.195 0.219 0.126 0.191
N 59276 59276 35509 52686
Note.–Weighted OLS using weights provided by the SOEP. Standard errors, which are
reported in parenthesis, are adjusted in order to take repeated observations into account.
The regression further includes quadratic functions of the individual’s age and the age of
the spouse, individual and spousal years of schooling, information about German-language
proﬁciency and German-language proﬁciency of the spouse, number of children in the
household, presence of children under 7 years old, state of residence, region of origin, and





Labor Supply Equations Including Wage and Income Variables (Including
Mixed Families, 1984-2005)
Wives Husbands
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Log (wife wage) -13.356 271.193** -66.873** -49.264**
(22.436) (24.991) (15.861) (18.403)
Log (husband wage) -182.213** -220.368** -578.275** -585.121**
(25.072) (28.271) (24.496) (26.762)
HH Asset Income (per 100 euros) 0.428* 0.357+ 1.594** 1.593**
(0.197) (0.188) (0.223) (0.223)
YSM, wife 42.692** 40.809** -19.332 -19.489
(10.915) (10.681) (12.403) (12.406)
YSM2, wife -0.665** -0.647** 0.235 0.237
(0.232) (0.225) (0.254) (0.255)
YSM, husband -9.835 -12.432 48.071** 47.984**
(12.381) (12.316) (16.695) (16.689)
YSM2, husband 0.014 0.113 -0.654* -0.649*
(0.239) (0.246) (0.318) (0.318)
IM89up, wife -593.448** -482.408** 91.726 98.560
(88.805) (86.719) (106.610) (106.747)
IM7488, wife -667.879** -593.641** 316.831* 321.246*
(132.663) (128.540) (152.996) (152.965)
IM4973, wife -504.332** -448.412** 341.057+ 344.135+
(171.046) (163.852) (192.570) (192.635)
IM89up, husband 225.911* 215.446* -950.826** -953.655**
(98.891) (95.370) (144.380) (144.568)
IM7488, husband 353.009* 333.785* -1003.120** -1006.126**
(138.942) (133.795) (223.380) (223.365)
IM4973, husband 400.315* 364.574* -1206.790** -1211.170**
(182.876) (175.570) (260.028) (260.074)
Constant 754.986** 543.144** -1128.612** -1137.854**
(196.246) (192.374) (178.225) (178.827)
R-squared 0.205 0.181 0.319 0.319
N 59276 59276 59276 59276
Note.–Additional regressors as in Table 1. Wages are imputed for those who are un-
employed by predicting log wages from a regression on a sample of individuals who worked
less than 700 hours in the previous year (estimated separately by gender). Estimates for





Tests for Indirect Evidence on Family Investment Hypothesis (Including
Mixed Families, 1984-2005)
Prob. of Training Job Tenure
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
YSM, husband -0.007 -0.042 0.319* 0.305*
(0.029) (0.026) (0.127) (0.133)
YSM2, husband -0.000 0.001* -0.006** -0.003
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
YSM, wife 0.018 -0.015 0.165 0.045
(0.027) (0.026) (0.142) (0.133)
YSM2, wife -0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
IM89up, husband 0.521+ 0.196 -3.228** -9.238**
(0.287) (0.215) (1.066) (1.150)
IM7488, husband 0.188 0.418 -2.693+ -7.901**
(0.352) (0.346) (1.534) (1.873)
IM4973, husband 0.280 0.298 -4.153* -9.693**
(0.437) (0.428) (2.020) (2.133)
IM89up, wife -0.008 0.209 -5.428** -1.873+
(0.225) (0.196) (1.009) (1.075)
IM7488, wife -0.046 -0.040 -4.101** -1.710
(0.281) (0.281) (1.454) (1.510)
IM4973, wife -0.193 0.048 -1.700 -2.111
(0.363) (0.364) (1.733) (1.815)
Constant -0.966+ -0.194 2.516 -2.392





Labor Supply and Wage Assimilation of Immigrants (Excluding Mixed
Families, 1984-2005)
Annual Hours Log Wages
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
YSM, wife 78.224** -27.898 0.037*
(22.272) (31.170) (0.015)
YSM2, wife -1.433** 0.630 -0.001*
(0.543) (0.816) (0.000)
YSM, husband -32.932 63.037* 0.017+
(22.468) (31.330) (0.010)
YSM2, husband 0.253 -1.444+ -0.000
(0.533) (0.786) (0.000)
IM89up, wife 83.860 -862.837* -0.497**
(324.859) (362.041) (0.115)
IM7488, wife -197.195 -680.403* -0.390*
(254.559) (277.371) (0.153)
IM4973, wife -31.607 -680.956* -0.243
(222.394) (266.251) (0.165)
IM89up, husband -371.025 188.503 -0.508**
(295.898) (326.642) (0.071)




Constant 781.051** -2025.485** 0.380* 0.445**
(220.163) (212.516) (0.180) (0.136)
R-squared 0.195 0.225 0.128 0.194
N 48701 48701 29636 43134
Note.–Additional regressors as in previous tables. Immigrants were married at the





Sequential Migrants: Labor Supply and Wage Assimilation of Immigrants
(Excluding Mixed Families, 1984-2005)a
Annual Hours Log Wages
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
YSM, wife 113.685** -39.912 0.068*
(26.642) (28.205) (0.029)
YSM2, wife -2.890** 0.386 -0.002*
(0.741) (0.854) (0.001)
YSM, husband -77.687* 51.461 0.004
(39.327) (57.431) (0.017)
YSM2, husband 1.694* -1.076 0.000
(0.809) (1.230) (0.000)
IM89up, wife -311.956 -595.211 -0.713**
(307.732) (494.540) (0.266)
IM7488, wife -514.824 -830.210 -0.469
(427.884) (583.186) (0.291)
IM4973, wife -354.287 -697.844 -0.489
(504.270) (640.296) (0.313)
IM7488, husband 6.981 -169.953 -0.351*
(358.694) (381.816) (0.178)




Constant 836.036** -2115.471** 0.366+ 0.383**
(235.503) (231.020) (0.194) (0.148)
R-squared 0.199 0.223 0.129 0.190
N 44080 44080 26837 39347
Note.–See Note to Table 4.





Simultaneous v Sequential Migration: Labor Supply Assimilation of
Immigrants (Excluding Mixed Families, 1984-2005)a
Simultaneous Sequential
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
YSM, wife 63.784** 83.541**
(20.771) (24.672)
YSM2, wife -1.885** -2.031**
(0.560) (0.600)
YSM, husband 49.495* 26.279
(22.093) (56.094)
YSM2, husband -1.318* -0.854
(0.624) (1.163)
IM89up, wife -362.790* -695.448**
(147.926) (208.618)
IM7488, wife -341.987 -800.799**
(224.521) (269.003)
IM4973, wife -77.547 -610.744+
(280.400) (354.795)
IM89up, husband -809.180** -592.547
(158.763) (494.583)
IM7488, husband -515.058* -895.893
(213.499) (668.476)
IM4973, husband -876.256** -377.271
(296.462) (672.735)
Constant 752.833** -2084.603** 864.409** -2086.525**
(227.706) (218.220) (234.894) (236.157)
R-squared 0.199 0.222 0.199 0.223
N 44894 44894 44080 44080
Note.–See Note to Table 4.





Simultaneous v Sequential Migration: Wage Assimilation of Immigrants
(Excluding Mixed Families)a
Simultaneous Sequential
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
YSM, wife 0.006 0.068*
(0.020) (0.029)
YSM2, wife -0.000 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
YSM, husband 0.005 0.004
(0.016) (0.017)
YSM2, husband 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
IM89up, wife -0.293* -0.713**
(0.145) (0.266)
IM7488, wife -0.244 -0.469
(0.198) (0.291)
IM4973, wife -0.064 -0.489
(0.215) (0.313)
IM89up, husband -0.466** -0.319+
(0.108) (0.184)
IM7488, husband -0.431** -0.351*
(0.134) (0.178)
IM4973, husband -0.423** -0.164
(0.154) (0.181)
Constant 0.352+ 0.445** 0.366+ 0.383**
(0.186) (0.141) (0.194) (0.148)
R-squared 0.130 0.191 0.129 0.190
N 27782 40113 26837 39347
Note.–See Note to Table 4.





Labor Supply and Wage Assimilation of Immigrant Husbands, Considering
the Presence of Wives (Excluding Mixed Families, 1984-2005)
Annual Hours Log Wages Annual Hours Log Wages
YSM, husband 74.127 0.019 61.011 0.011
(84.622) (0.021) (62.765) (0.017)
YSM2, husband -1.867 -0.001 -1.487 -0.000
(1.890) (0.000) (1.365) (0.000)
YSM, wife -46.235 -38.366
(29.415) (27.244)
YSM2, wife 0.563 0.371
(0.881) (0.813)
IM7488, husband -117.460 -0.425* -121.176 -0.412*
(398.382) (0.208) (375.410) (0.183)
IM4973, husband 495.678 -0.225 561.117 -0.221
(436.252) (0.206) (446.451) (0.190)
IM89up, husband -0.401+ -0.368*
(0.212) (0.187)
IM89up, wife -685.701 -649.255
(671.267) (526.085)
IM7488, wife -964.774 -917.222
(723.888) (627.968)
IM4973, wife -831.898 -750.818
(746.403) (672.956)
With wife in Germany 184.661 0.252 -712.935 0.838+
(1063.809) (0.304) (1369.239) (0.498)
YSM with wife in Germany -28.552 -0.034 17.419 -0.075
(100.093) (0.030) (121.816) (0.046)
YSM2 with wife in Germany 0.973 0.001 0.276 0.001
(2.195) (0.001) (2.517) (0.001)
Constant -2124.265** 0.382** -2117.317** 0.375*
(230.422) (0.148) (230.772) (0.148)
R-squared 0.223 0.190 0.224 0.190
N 44080 39347 44080 39347
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Note.–See Note to Figure 1.
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Note.–The sample for Germany excludes immigrants with native spouses.
Figure 6
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